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The shadow that looms large over this book is
the “Keeling Curve” (ﬁrst mentioned at p. 97):
Charles David Keeling (1925–2005), a geochem-
ist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography,
had begun in 1957 to monitor atmospheric car-
bon dioxide at a high-altitude base onMauna Loa
in Hawaii.1 His measurements demonstrated a
steady annual increase in CO2 levels, and in cor-
relation with historical Russian-Swiss ice core
samples from the Antarctic, documented the dra-
matic rise of contemporary global warming.2 The
Mauna Loa zig-zag graph (showing characteristic
seasonal variations) thus became the “central icon
of the greenhouse effect.”3
The three legal scholars who coauthored the
present volume have been involved in the evolu-
tion of international climate change treaty-mak-
ing from its very beginnings: Daniel Bodansky
(Arizona State University) ﬁrst interned with
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change in Geneva in the 1990s (under Jean
Ripert as chairman and Michael Zammit
Cutajar as Executive Secretary) and later attended
many of the treaty meetings as observer and con-
sultant to the secretariat; Jutta Brunnée
(University of Toronto Faculty of Law) already
served as legal adviser to the Canadian delegation
at the climate law negotiations twenty years ago;
and Lavanya Rajamani (New Delhi Centre for
Policy Research) chronicled the twists and turns
of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC), its 1997 Kyoto
Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement, in her
annual reports for the British International and
Comparative Law Quarterly since 2008. It is
safe to say that, between the three of them,
what they do not know about the subject is prob-
ably not worth knowing.
To be sure, the authors do not view interna-
tional climate change law as a self-contained
body of law with its own sources, principles,
and methods of lawmaking, instead anchoring
it “squarely within the ﬁeld of international envi-
ronmental law and public international law more
broadly” (p. 11). In the burgeoning literature on
the topic, others have already boldly proclaimed
1 Charles D. Keeling, The Concentration and Isotopic
Abundances of Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere,
12 TELLUS 200 (1960); Charles D. Keeling, Is Carbon
Dioxide from Fossil Fuel Changing Man’s Environment?,
114 PROC. AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC’Y 10 (1970);
Daniel C. Harris, Charles David Keeling and the Story
of Atmospheric CO2 Measurements, 82 ANALYTICAL
CHEMISTRY 7865 (2010).
2 Ulrich Siegenthaler & Hans Oeschger, Biospheric
CO2 Emissions During the Past 200 Years Reconstructed
by Deconvolution of Ice Core Data, 39B TELLUS 140
(1987); PETER H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 3 (1990).
3 SPENCER R. WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL
WARMING 35 (rev. ed. 2008).
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climate change law a novel legal discipline,4 only
to be challenged by critics who caution against
introducing yet another futile “Law of the
Horse.”5 It is perhaps worth recalling that inter-
national environmental law itself only ascended
to the rank of a recognized discipline of its own
in the 1990s;6 even though some commentators
now consider climate change “an issue of such
scale and complexity that it deﬁes resolution
through the constrained channels of an interna-
tional environmental treaty.”7
Undeterred by such dire warnings, the authors
have forged ahead to produce a genuine bench-
mark study: to wit, a timely account of the legal
arsenal currently available to face the challenge of
global climatic change. After an introductory
general part deﬁning the “art and craft” of inter-
national lawmaking in this ﬁeld (principles and
treaty techniques), roughly half of the book
covers the chronological development and
the legal substance of the three key instruments
concluded under UN auspices (the Rio
Conventions,8 the Kyoto Protocol,9 and the
Paris Climate Agreement10). The other half
addresses regulatory initiatives beyond that triad
(including the work of other global and regional
institutions, and related “polycentric” action at
national and non-governmental levels); and the
intersections with other areas of international
law (such as human rights, migration, and
world trade). A brief concluding section summa-
rizes the ﬁndings of the study, cautiously assessing
the “effectiveness” of contemporary international
climate change law.
A recurring theme, both in the book’s histori-
cal narrative and its substantive analysis of the
global “architecture” of climate governance,11
is the dialectic contrast between a “top-down”
approach (meaning collectively agreed emission
targets/caps) and a “bottom-up” approach (mean-
ing nationally determined contributions), applied
to the analysis of the post-Rio and post-Kyoto
negotiations at successive meetings of the
Conference of the Parties from 1995 to 2015
(see the milestones table 4.1, at p. 100). In
essence, those diplomatic interim accords “mean-
dered back and forth, from the comparatively
vague and in some cases hortatory provisions of
the FCCC, to the hard obligations of result in the
Kyoto Protocol, to the political agreement
reﬂected in the Copenhagen Accord, to the hard
obligations of conduct in the Paris Agreement”
(p. 22). The ﬁnal result is presented as a synthesis
or “hybrid” of the two approaches (pp. 23–26,
4 See, e.g., Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Law: The
Emergence of a New Discipline, 32 MELBOURNE
U. L. REV. 922 (2008); Dan Bondi Ogolla, Foreword,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, at vii (Cinnamon P. Carlarne,
Kevin R. Gray & Richard G. Tarasofsky eds., 2016);
Daniel A. Farber & Marjan Peeters, The Emergence of
Global Climate Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 687
(Daniel A. Farber & Marjan Peeters eds., 2016).
5 John B. Ruhl& James E. Salzman,Climate Change
Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975 (2013).
The term (ironically describing an unsystematic com-
pilation of rules) is by Gerhard Casper, as quoted by
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, [1996] U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, and originally
inspired by Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on
Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 737 (1939).
6 SeeOscar Schachter,The Emergence of International
Environmental Law, 44 J. INT’L AFF. 457 (1991);
Editors of the Harvard Law Review, Developments
in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1484 (1991) (editor-in-chief of the
review at the time happened to be one Barack Obama).
7 Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Delinking International
Environmental Law and Climate Change, 4
MICH. J. ENVTL & ADMIN. L. 1, 4 (2014); cited by
Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford & Emily Barritt, The
Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change, 80
MODERN L. REV. 173, 200 (2017).
8 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for
signature June 5, 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; UN
Convention to Combat Desertiﬁcation in Those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertiﬁcation, Particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994,
1954 UNTS 3; UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC), May 9, 1992, 1771
UNTS 107.
9 Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC, Dec. 11, 1997,
2303 UNTS 162.
10 Paris Agreement (Dec. 13, 2015), in UN FCCC,
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Twenty-First Session, Addendum, at 21, UN Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016).
11 Term coined by Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse
Policy Architectures and Institutions, in ECONOMICS AND
POLICY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE 137 (William D.
Nordhaus ed., 1998).
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214, 351), laid out in detail in table 7.1 (pp. 251–
57), distinguishing “provisions that create obliga-
tions” from recommendatory and aspirational
provisions.12
Whether or not the Paris outcome is a
“Goldilocks solution”13 remains to be seen.
Canada, it will be remembered, had already
found the Kyoto porridge too hot and quit
in 2011 (pp. 201, 204).14 And the withdrawal
of the United States from the Paris Agreement
in 2017 (grimly anticipated at p. 361) was not
motivated by doubts about the formal legal char-
acter of the agreement (which astutely avoided
using the word “treaty”),15 but by the Trump
Administration’s discovery of the “hard” non-
regression rule in Article 4.11, which precludes
a ratcheting down of declared national commit-
ments.16 Yet, for the time being, U.S.
participation in the agreement will continue—
pursuant to Article 28—at least until November
4, 202017 (i.e., by sheer coincidence, the day
after the next presidential elections), albeit under
a peculiar state of “self-declared non-compliance.”
The situation is remotely comparable to the status
of Russia under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,18
between 1995 and 2002. There, after the
Russian Federation declared itself unable to com-
ply, inter alia, with Article 4 regarding the export
ban for ozone-depleting substances to non-party
states, the case was eventually resolved by multilat-
eral consultations through that treaty’s
Implementation Committee.19
The other theme vexing climate change law-
making since the 1990s has been North-South
differentiation, under the now-axiomatic principle
of “common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC, pp. 26–
30, 121–23, 165–69, 219–26, 354)—“perhaps
the most divisive overarching issue in the Paris
Agreement negotiations” (p. 219). Whereas the
Kyoto Protocol had still cemented a virtual
“Chinese wall,”20 separating Annex-I (developed)
fromnon-Annex-I (developing) countries in terms
of their respective treaty obligations, the Paris
Agreement succeeded in extending the geographic
scope of common basic commitments to all
12 Refuting early academic criticism which charac-
terized the Agreement as “essentially a statement of
good intentions” (Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Paris
Approach to Global Governance, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Dec. 28, 2015), at https://www.project-syndicate.
org/commentary/paris-agreement-model-for-global-
governance-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2015-12), and
not “even an obligation to comply” (Richard Falk,
“Voluntary” International Law and the Paris
Agreement (Jan. 16, 2016), available at https://
richardfalk.wordpress.com/2016/01/16/voluntary-
international-law-and-the-paris-agreement).
13 Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change
Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AJIL 288, 289 (2016).
14 By contrast, the current Canadian government
ratiﬁed and ﬁrmly supports the 2015 Paris Agreement.
15 Pp. 210–12. On the notorious different meaning
of “treaties” in U.S. constitutional law as compared to
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(1513 UNTS 293), see also Lavanya Rajamani, The
Devilish Details: Key Legal Issues in the 2015 Climate
Negotiations, 78 MODERN L. REV. 826 (2015); and
Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris
Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL L.
142 (2016).
16 For an account of the internal White House dis-
pute preceding the withdrawal, see John Schwartz,
Debate Over Paris Climate Deal Could Turn on a
Single Phrase, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017); see also
Lavanya Rajamani & Jutta Brunnée, The Legality of
Downgrading Nationally Determined Contributions
Under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US
Disengagement, 29 J. ENVTL L. 537 (2017). On the
non-regression principle, see generally LA NON-
RÉGRESSION EN DROIT DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT (Michel
Prieur & Gonzalo Sozzo eds., 2012), and Ramon
Ojeda Mestre, Del eterno retorno a la no regresión, 44
ENVTL POL’Y & L. 125 (2014); but see also the caveat
by Edith BrownWeiss, id. at 138, regarding the poten-
tial impact of new scientiﬁc evidence.
17 Lavanya Rajamani, Reﬂections on the U.S.
Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement,
EJIL TALK! (June 5, 2017).
18 London Amendment of June 29, 1990, 1598
UNTS 469; accepted by the Russian Federation on
Jan. 12, 1992.
19 See Jacob Werksman, Compliance and Transition:
Russia’s Non-compliance Tests the Ozone Regime, 56
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 750 (1996); David G. Victor,
The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol’s
Non-compliance Procedure, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 137, 155–64
(David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B.
Skolnikoff eds., 1998).
20 Jorge Viñuales, The Paris Climate Agreement:
An Initial Examination, Part III, EJIL TALK! (Feb. 8,
2016).
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW1076 Vol. 111:4
parties, while preserving a range of softening
exceptions and incentives for Third World coun-
tries. Rather than abandoning the sacrosanct
CBDR-RC “binary approach,”21 the Agreement
converted it into a new system aptly described
here as “bounded self-differentiation” (p. 223)
for mitigation measures, further operationalized
for purposes of transparency and ﬁnance
(pp. 225–26).22 The compromise so reached—
and narrowly preserved in the dramatic last-
minute correction of the controversial “shall/
should” language in Article 4.4 (p. 224)—is
shown to owe much to the Obama
Administration’s bilateral deals with China and
India (pp. 82, 280–81).23
The parts of the book likely to be of greatest
interest to a non-specialized audience are chapters
8 and 9, on “Climate Governance Beyond
the United Nations Climate Regime” and
“Intersections Between International Climate
Change Law and Other Areas of International
Law,” respectively. To be precise, the heading of
chapter 8may be amisnomer after all; for the triad
of the UN climate change treaties is but one
component (if a central one) of what has more
accurately been described as a “regime com-
plex,”24 comprising a highly fragmented multi-
tude of autonomous or quasi-autonomous
regulatory instruments within the UN system.
These include the 1985/1987 ozone layer treaties
(greenhouse gases “controlled by the Montreal
Protocol” are expressly exempted from Article 4
of the FCCC and Article 2 of the Kyoto
Protocol, p. 273); the air and sea transport con-
ventions under the auspices of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), to
whom the control of greenhouse gases from avia-
tion andmarine bunker fuels is referred by Article
2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol;25 and several multilat-
eral agreements operating under the auspices of
the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UN/ECE; e.g., for “dual impact” emis-
sions of air pollutants such as climate-harmful
black carbon, now covered by the amended
Gothenburg Protocol to the 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution;26
and for motor vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide
and other exhaust gases, under global technical
regulations adopted since 1998 by the Geneva-
21 Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement,
supra note 13, at 317.
22 See also Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira,
“Dynamic Differentiation”: The Principles of
CBDR-RC, Progression and Highest Possible Ambition
in the Paris Agreement, 5 TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL L.
285 (2016).
23 See, e.g., India’s declaration on ratiﬁcation of the
Paris Agreement (Oct. 2, 2016, following the “Second
US-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue” in New
Delhi, Aug. 30–31, 2016):
The Government of India declares its under-
standing that, as per its national laws; keeping
in view its development agenda, particularly the
eradication of poverty and provision of basic
needs for all its citizens, coupled with its commit-
ment to following the low carbon path to pro-
gress, and on the assumption of unencumbered
availability of cleaner sources of energy and tech-
nologies and ﬁnancial resources from around the
world; and based on a fair and ambitious assess-
ment of global commitment to combating cli-
mate change, it is ratifying the Paris Agreement.
United Nations Multilateral Treaty Database, Status
of Treaties, ch. XXVII (Environment), 7.d (Paris
Agreement), at https://treaties.un.org/pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&clang=_en#EndDec.
24 RobertO.Keohane&DavidG.Victor,TheRegime
Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS
7 (2011). See also HARRO VAN ASSELT, THE
FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE:
CONSEQUENCES AND MANAGEMENT OF REGIME
INTERACTIONS 3 (2014).
25 P. 266. On recent decisions regarding greenhouse
gas regulations for aircraft and ships, by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Assembly and the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) Marine Environment Protection Committee,
see Tanveer Ahmad, Environmental Law: Emissions, in
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AVIATION LAW
197, 243 (Paul S. Dempsey & Ram S. Jakhu eds.,
2017); and Nathalie Clarenc Bicudo, L’OMI et l’air
impur du large: la vie juridique des règles relatives à la pol-
lution atmosphérique des navires, 121 REVUEGÉNÉRALE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 361 (2017).
26 P. 276: Protocol to Abate Acidiﬁcation,
Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, Dec. 1,
1999, 2319 UNTS 81, amendments of May 4, 2012
(not yet in force); see Stefan Reis, et al., From Acid Rain
to Climate Change, 338 SCIENCE 1153 (2012).
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based World Forum for Harmonization of
Vehicle Regulations).27
There have been several efforts to cope with
this normative fragmentation, by way of over-
arching codiﬁcations such as the draft “Legal
Principles relating to Climate Change” adopted
by the International Law Association (ILA) at
its Washington Conference in April 2014,28
repeatedly referenced in this book (pp. 39, 41–
44, 52, 54);29 and the “Oslo Principles on
Global Climate Change Obligations” drafted by
another non-governmental expert group in
March 2015.30 By contrast, the seemingly more
general legal guidelines for “Protection of
the Atmosphere” being prepared by the UN
International Law Commission (ILC) since
201331 operate under a severely restrictive man-
date, deliberately excluding (1) “questions such
as: liability of States and their nationals, the pol-
luter-pays principle, the precautionary principle,
common but differentiated responsibilities, and
the transfer of funds and technology to developing
countries, including intellectual property rights”;
and (2) “speciﬁc substances, such as black carbon,
tropospheric ozone, and other dual-impact
substances, which are the subject of negotiations
among States.”32 Given that virtually all of those
“no-go” topics are indeed among the very key con-
cerns of international climate change law, the
future relevance of the ILC draft guidelines in
this context is likely to be marginal at best.
Chapter 9 opens with an analysis of the inter-
section between climate change and human rights,
though noting with some disappointment that the
only explicit reference to states’ human rights obli-
gations appears in the preamble of the Paris
Agreement (p. 312). Yet, there are a number of
areas where human rights concerns are bound to
inﬂuence the practical application of the climate
change treaties indirectly, not least in what the
authors refer to as “judicial governance”
(pp. 283–90). In fact, the growing volume of law-
suits in national civil and administrative courts,
challenging governmental action (or inaction) to
combat and mitigate the harmful consequences
of climate change,33 typically involves claims alleg-
ing the violation of individual or group rights to a
healthy environment, often invoking global and
regional human rights treaties (p. 287). By the
same token, the humanitarian aspects of climate-
induced migration and displacement have at least
begun to be recognized as part of the “adaptation”
component of the continuing negotiations
on funding gaps,34 both under the FCCC
(pp. 325–27) and under the auspices of the UN
Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.35
27 Agreement Concerning the Establishing of
Global Technical Regulations for Wheeled Vehicles,
Equipment and Parts Which Can Be Fitted and/or
Be Used on Wheeled Vehicles, June 25, 1998, 2119
UNTS 129; e.g., uniform emission test procedures,
UN Doc. ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2017/95 (April 10,
2017). The Geneva standards (also accepted by
Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, Tunisia, South
Africa, and the United States) were preceded by a series
of UN/ECE regional technical regulations under the
Agreement Concerning the Adoption of Uniform
Conditions for Approval and Reciprocal Recognition
of Approval for Motor Vehicles Equipment and
Parts, Mar. 20, 1958, rev. 1995, 335 UNTS 211.
28 THIRD REPORT OF THE ILA COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
PRINCIPLES RELATING TO CLIMATE CHANGE (Shinya
Murase ed., 2014).
29 See pp. 39, 41–43, 52, 54. All three authors of this
book were members of the ILA Committee between
2008 and 2014, with Lavanya Rajamani as Rapporteur.
30 OSLO PRINCIPLES ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
OBLIGATIONS (Jaap Spiel ed., 2015).
31 Text of the nine draft guidelines provisionally
adopted, with commentaries, in Int’l Law Comm’n,
Rep. to the General Assembly on the Work of Its
69th Session, ch. VI, UN Doc. A/72/10 (2017).
32 Int’l LawComm’n, Rep. to the General Assembly
on the Work of Its 65th Session, 115, para. 168, UN
Doc. A/68/10 (2013) (“understanding” on the scope
of the project); reprinted in the session report by
Sean D. Murphy, 108 AJIL 41, 56 (2014). See
Peter H. Sand, The Discourse on “Protection of the
Atmosphere” in the International Law Commission, 26
REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL L. 201 (2017).
33 MICHAEL BURGER & JUSTIN GUNDLACH, THE
STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL
REVIEW (2017).
34 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
THE ADAPTATION FINANCE GAP REPORT 3, 44 (2016).
35 United Nations Ofﬁce for Disaster Risk
Reduction, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030, para. 47(d), UN Doc.
A/CONF.224/CRP.1 (2015), available at http://
www.unisdr.org/ﬁles/43291_sendaiframeworkfordr-
ren.pdf (calling for the incorporation of disaster risk
reduction measures into development assistance
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The most thought-provoking part of the book,
from this reviewer’s perspective, is the discussion
of the relationship between the new climate
change law and international trade law, raising
“perhaps themost controversial and difﬁcult inter-
face issues” (p. 327). As soon as states (and the
European Union) begin to implement the Paris
Agreement in earnest, they will inevitably
invoke and apply domestic legal instruments
that are bound to have signiﬁcant transnational
effects—from carbon taxes to emission trading
schemes, higher environmental standards, and
subsidies (e.g., for renewable vs. fossil-fuel
energy sources). In order not to penalize their
own industries for complying with onerous
new climate protection requirements (vis-à-vis
potential free-riding foreign competitors), they
are likely to resort to trade-related “response
measures” such as import restrictions and bor-
der tax adjustments, any one of which might
conﬂict with GATT/WTO free-trade rules and
“disciplines.” While Article 3.5 of the FCCC
(followed by Article 2.3 of the Kyoto
Protocol) neither condones nor forbids such
unilateral measures, that ambivalent “hands-
off approach” (p. 348) may no longer sufﬁce
in the event of trade disputes under the Paris
Agreement, with its heightened reliance on
“nationally determined” action. Rather than
falling back on the Agreement’s own dispute
settlement rules,36 a state challenging such mea-
sures would instead tend to turn to the World
Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement
Body, which has dealt with climate-related
issues before,37 and which is likely to “play
signiﬁcant roles in shaping bottom-up climate
action” (p. 349) in the future. In the turbulent
legal climate ahead, the Bodansky-Brunnée-
Rajamani treatise will provide a reliable manual
for servicing the architectural ediﬁce now in
place.
PETER H. SAND
Institute of International Law,
University of Munich
he
programs, including those for “adaptation to climate
change”); see also THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION INCLUDING CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION (Ilan Kelman, Jessica Mercer &
Jean-Christophe Gaillard eds., 2017).
36 Article 24 of the Paris Agreement incorporates by
reference the traditional procedural options of FCCC
Article 14 (which have never been used in practice).
37 See pp. 343–47, on the cases concerning
Canada’s and India’s renewable energy “feed-in tar-
iffs”; Reports of the WTO Appellate Body:
WT/DS412/AB/R (2013), WT/DS426/AB/R
(2013), and WT/DS456/AB/R (2016).
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